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Common Carrier Liability Under the
Copyright Act of 1976

n just twenty years, the cable television industry in America has
grown from an infant enterprise,
serving only isolated communities with
limited programming, to a multi-million dollar giant, serving both urban and
rural areas alike. In addition to providing communities with distant broadcast
signals, cable television now offers
round-the-clock movies, sports, news,
music, and even exclusive weekly serials.
Currently attracting over 250,000 new
subscribers each month,l cable, or
community antenna television (CATV),
has proven itself to be a viable alternative to advertiser-supported broadcasting.

I

The cable industry's rapid growth has
not been untroubled, however. Since
the early days of cable television,
CATV systems prospered, not by originating their own programming, 2 but by
distributing the broadcast signals of individual television stations to dist:mt
communities that suffered from poor
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television reception. To improve reception, cable companies would install
powerful receiving antennae on the outskirts of subscribing communities. If reception was still poor, then the cable
company would hire a communications
common carrier to receive and strengthen
distant broadcast signals and retransmit
them to the cable system's main receiving antenna or "headend" for subsequent distribution to the subscribing
community via cables running directly
into the homes of paying customers.
Ordinarily, the common carrier would
broadcast television signals without
ever obtaining the permission of the
television stations and without ever
compensating the copyright owners for
the right to transmit their programs. 3
This practice infuriated television copyright owners, who realized that cable

Copyright owners
claim that common
carriers infringe their
exclusive
performance rights
by retransmitting
copyrighted television
programs.
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systems were distributing their programs to viewers for a profit without
paying for performance rights.
The copyright owner of a television
program profits by licensing television
stations to broadcast the program in return for compensation. The amount of
compensation often varies with the size
of the broadcaster's pDtential audience.
In 1968, the copyright owners of several television programs sued a CATV
company for copyright infringement in
Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television. 4 The copyright owners argued
that, under the Copyright Act of 19095
then in effect, the CATV systems infringed the owners' exclusive right to
"publicly perform" their copyrighted
programs. The Supreme Court rejected
this argument and held that the CATV
systems, in distributing broadcast signals containing copyrighted programs,
did not "perform" the copyrighted
works and so were not liable for
infringement. 6

Eight years later, however, Congress
imposed liability for such distributions
when it enacted the Copyright Act of
1976 (Act),7 which contains an exemption
from liability for CATV retransmissions
of broadcast signals, provided the
CATV system pays a compulsory
licensing fee to the Copyright Royalty
Tribunal.8 These fees are then apportioned
among copyright owners who have
established entitlement with the Copy~
right Royalty Tribunal. 9 Under this
scheme, Congress has provided for the
continued growth of the cable industry
and, at the same time, has ensured
compensation to copyright owners.
Recently, copyright problems arose
with respect to another party necessary
to the cable industry, namely, the
communications common carrier. A
common carrier is an intermediary paid
by CATV systems to receive and
transport television signals from distant
broadcast stations to the CATV system's
main receiving antenna or h.eadend for
subsequent distribution to individual
subs~ibers.lO Copyright owners claim
that common carriers infringe their
exclusive performance rights by re~
transmitting copyrighted television
programs. This issue was raised in two
recent cases involving communications
common carriers: Eastern Microwave,
Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc. (EMI)" and
WON Continental Broadcasting Co. v.
United Video, Inc. (WON).!2
In EMI, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed
the United States District Court for the
Northern District of New York and
found that the carrier was exempt from
copyright liability.!3 In WON, the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed the lower
court and held that the common carrier
was not exempt from liability under the
Act.!4
This article examines these two cases
and the conflicting resolutions by the
second and seventh circuits of the
carrier exemption issue and concludes
that carriers that retransmit broadcast
signals to CATV systems should be
exempt from liability for copyright
infringement.

The Copyright Act of 1976
Section 106(4) of the Copyright Act
of 1976 gives a copyright owner the
exclusive right to publicly perform
copyrighted works. Under the Act's
broad definition of "perform,"!5 the
showing of a "motion picture or other

audiovisual work" is a performance.
Thus, the showing of a typical tele~
vision program, which qualifies as an
"audiovisual work,"!6 is a performance
under the Act.
Ordinary television broadcasts are
considered "primary transmissions,"
and television stations avoid "public
performance" liability under the Act by
paying licensing fees directly to copy~
right owners. CATV systems and carri~
ers that retransmit ordinary television
signals to their subscribers are exempted
from performance infringement provided
they comply with § 111 of the Act.
Subsections (c), (d) and (e) of § 111
apply to CATV systems. These sub~
sections establish the compulsory
licensing scheme discussed above.
Subsection 111(a)(3) applies to common
carriers and contains the so~called passive
carrier exemption, which states:

Only by maintaining
its role as a passive
ttmessenger for hire"
can the common
carrier avoid
copyright liability.
The secondary transmission of a
primary transmission embodying
a performance ... is not an infringe~
ment of copyright if.. ..
(3) the secondary transmission is
made by any carrier who has no
direct or indirect control over the
content or selection of the primary
transmission or over the particular
recipients of the secondary trans~
mission, and whose activities with
respect to the secondary trans~
mission consist solely of providing
wires, cables or other communi~
cations channels for the use of
others .... !7
The Act does not define the term
"secondary transmission." However, if
a carrier can meet the qualifications of
this section, then its transmission is not
an infringement of copyright. If, how~
ever, the carrier (i) exerts control over
the content or selection of the original
broadcast signal, (ii) exerts control over
the recipients of its own retransmission,

or (iii) in some manner uses its
communications channels for its own
purposes, then the exemption is inappli~
cable and the carrier becomes liable
under § 106( 4) for copyright infringe~
ment.

The Passive Carrier Exemption
The primary issue raised in EMI and
WON was whether the respective com~
mon carriers qualified for the passive
carrier exemption under § 111(a)(3) of
the Act. In determining whether the ex~
emption's three requirements were met,
the courts examined all of the circum~
stances surrounding the challenged
retransmissions.
In 1982, Eastern Microwave, Inc.
(EMI), a licensed communications
carrier!8 retransmitting the broadcast
signal ofWOR~TV in New York City,!9
sought a declaratory judgment against
Doubleday Sports, which owned the
copyright to the New York Mets' games
broadcast seasonally on WOR~TV.20
The suit sought to establish that EMl's
retransmissions qualified for the passive
carrier exemption. EMI contended that
it had, in retransmitting WOR~ TV's
broadcast signal, exercised "no control
over the content or selection of the
primary transmission or over the
recipients of the secondary transmission
and that its activity is limited to
providing wires" and other avenues of
communication solely for the use of its
customers, the CATV systems. 21
The lower court found against EMI
for several reasons. First, the court
found that, by choosing the WOR~ TV
signal for satellite retransmission, EMI
exercised "selection" of the primary
transmission. 22 Additionally, the court
held that, by contracting with particular
CATV systems that wished to receive
the retransmissions, EMI exercised
"control" over the recipients of its
secondary transmission. 23 Finally, the
court held that, by aggressively market~
ing its ability to retransmit WOR~TV's
signal by satellite, EMI evidenced that it
was not providing its communications
channels "solely for the use of others,"
but was instead "selling" the broadcast
signal as a product for its own benefit.24
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed the district
court's decision. 25 The appellate court
recognized that EMI had the ability to
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retransmit only one signal via satellite
and that the "initial, one-time" selection
of WOR-TV's signal was not "control
over the content and selection of the
primary transmission."26 The court also
found that EMI did not exercise
"control" over the particular recipients
of its retransmission by contracting with
various CATV systems. EMI, the court
noted, was required, as a licensed
communications carrier, to accept all
reasonable requests for its service. 27
Finding that "no reasonable requests for
its services was ever refused by EMI,"
the court concluded that there was no
showing of "control" within the meaning of the § 111 (a)( 3) requirement. 28 As
to the third and final requirement under
§ 111(a)(3), the court found that EMl's
advertising of its ability to transmit a
particular signal was a "normal business
activity,"29 which did not disrupt the
fact that EMI was offering its communications services solely for the use of
CATV systems that could not afford
their own relay equipment. 3o Accordingly, the court held that EMl's
retransmissions were exempt from
infringement under § 111(a)(3).31
The common carrier exemption,
located in the same section of the Act as
the cable television compulsory licensing plan,32 was enacted to further the
purposes of the compulsory licensing
plan. 33 Congress, in enacting the cable
television compulsory licensing scheme,
devised a compromise which provided
compensation to copyright owners
while ensuring the continued growth of
the cable industry by removing the need
for individual contracts between CATV
systems and copyright owners.34
In the 1960's, as CATV systems became principally concerned with the
30-The Law Forum/Spring, I984

importation of distant broadcast signals,35 their dependency on the common carrier, as the transporter of those
signals, increased. Recognizing that the
cable industry would not flourish as intended without a continuous supply of
broadcast material,36 Congress created
the common carrier exemption, which
ensures that qualified carriers will not
be subjected to the unwieldy process of
negotiating with individual copyright
owners for the performance rights to
each retransmitted program. 37
By establishing the particular requirements of the § 111 (a)( 3) exemption, however, Congress made clear its
intention that the carrier's role was to be
restricted to that of a non-contributing,
passive intermediary between the broadcaster and the CATV system. Thus, a
carrier seeking the exemption may not
add or subtract material from the
broadcaster's primary transmission, or
be selective in choosing its customers. 38
Only by maintaining this role as a
passive "messenger for hire," can the
carrier avoid liability. This scheme
ensures a steady variety of broadcast
material, which in tum encourages the
growth of the cable industry, as
Congress intended. 39
Had the lower court's decision in EMI
been upheld on appeal, then Congress'
intention would have been thwarted. 40
The lower court would have withheld
the exemption from EMI for having
intially "selected" a particular broadcast
signal to retransmit. This ruling would,
in effect, have required all carriers to
retransmit "every television broadcast
of every television station in the
country" in order to remain exempt. 41
Additionally, the district court er-

roneously indicated that a carrier, by
offering its services at a rate unaffordable
to all CATV companies,42 would lose
the exemption for exercising "selection" over the recipients of its retransmission. Finally, the district court left
unresolved the question of what type of
advertising by a common carrier to
attract customers would exploit a
copyrighted program for commercial
benefit, rather than provide services
"solely for the use of" subscribers.43

If carriers risked their exemption by
engaging in activities such as choosing a
signal, setting particular rates or advertising, then carriers seeking to avoid
copyright liability would have only two
options left. First, a carrier could
attempt to secure licenses from every
copyright owner of every retransmitted
program. Even if the carrier were
successful in obtaining such licenses,
licensing fees would amount to a
second royalty payment to the copyright owner, even though the number of
home viewers remained constant. Since
the amount of royalties paid by a
CATV system under the Act is
designed to fluctuate with the number
of home subscribers, additional licensing payments by carriers would disrupt
the scheme. 44 Second, a carrier that is
unable or unwilling to obtain licenses
would have no choice but to cease
operations to avoid liability. This
would impair the growth of the cable
industry, which is the opposite of what
Congress intended. 45
To fully effectuate Congress' intent
to maintain the flow of programming to
CATV systems, the common carrier exemption must remain available to carriers that initially select a particular

broadcast signal to transmit, contract
with all CATV systems able to meet
their service rates or advertise their
ability to offer a particular signal. Had
the carrier in EMI added its own communication to a retransmission or selected to serve only particular CATV
systems, then a different result might
have occurred. These facts, however,
were not present in EMI.

Control Over The Primary
Transmission
In WON,46 Chicago television station
WON began experimenting with the
"vertical blanking interval" (VB!) of
its broadcast signal. The VB! is the extremely short period of time needed for
television circuitry to reset between
frames. 47 During this interval, coded information can be inserted for transmission along with the program material.
This added information, known as
"teletext," can be viewed on television
sets equipped with special decoders.
Teletext can appear as subtitles at the
bottom of the television screen (as is
done with closed-captions for the hearing impaired) or may be displayed separately as an entire screenful of typed
information. WON's teletext was of the
latter variety and consisted of local Chicago news and a program schedule inserted in the VB! of its copyrighted nine
o'clock p.m. national news program. 48
Viewers using a decoder could either
watch the news program, or switch to
the decoded teletext. 49
Defendant United Video, a common
carrier that retransmitted the WON signal via satellite, began stripping the teletext information out of the broadcast
signal and substituting teletext supplied
by Dow Jones before retransmitting the
signal to CATV systems. 50 WON sued
United Video for copyright infringement and for a permanent injunction to
prevent United Video from removing
its teletext. The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division denied WON's
motion for injunction and instead
granted summary judgment for United
Video. 5!
At the trial, WON argued that its
entire broadcast signal (including its
teletext) constituted the "primary
transmission," and that the removal of
any part of that signal, namely WON's
teletext, amounted to "control of the
primary transmission," an act that
precluded the passive carrier exemption. 52

The district court rejected this argument, however, and held that under
§ 111(a)(3), the "primary transmission" is not the entire broadcast signal,
but is limited to "the copyrighted
works which are initially broadcast and
retransmi tted. "53
This determination compelled a further inquiry. Since the district court
defined "primary transmission" as the
"copyrighted work," then United Video
would be exerting "control over the primary transmission" only if the nine
o'clock news and the simultaneously
broadcast teletext amounted to a single
copyrightable work. If the teletext and
news program were copyrightable as

In view of the
carrier's intended
role as a non ..
interfering message
((conduit," Congress
could not have
meant for the
common carrier
exemption to apply
to a carrier that
removes a portion of
a broadcaster's
message and replaces
it with material from
another source, as
was done in WGN.
separate works, then United Video's
refusal to retransmit the teletext would
not alter the "passive" character of its
retransmission of the nine o'clock
news.
The district court, relying on the
Act's definition of "audiovisual work"
which, in part, requires "a series of related images,"54 found that the teletext
material, which could not be seen together with the nine o'clock news, was
not part of the same "series of related
images" as the news program. 55 Thus,
United Video was entitled to an exemption under § 111(a)(3) with regard to

the retransmission of the nine o'clock
news program. 56
On appeal, however, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed this decision. 57 Although the appellate court agreed that
United Video would be exerting control over the primary transmission
"only if WON's copyright of the nine
o'clock news includes the teletext in the
vertical blanking intervals," it disputed
the district court's finding that the news
program and the teletext were not "related images" copyrightable as a single
audiovisual work. The court found that
the two sources of information
amounted to a "two-channel" news
program, both channels of which were
"intended to be seen by the same viewers" who could switch back and forth
between the sources with the decoder.
Thus United Video was not an exempt
carrier, for in stripping out WON's
teletext, it had exerted control over the
copyrighted material constituting the
primary transmission. 58
In view of the carrier's intended role
as a non-interfering message "conduit,"
Congress could not have meant for the
common carrier exemption to apply to
a carrier that removes a portion of a
broadcaster's message and replaces it
with material from another source, as
was done in WON. Unlike EMl's
retransmission, United Video's retransmission was not "passive." Thus, on
the facts, EMI and WON are distinguishable. However, the two opinions
have produced inconsistent definitions
of the term, "primary transmission."
In EMI, the nature of the carrier's
retransmission was not at issue. Both
the district and circuit courts defined
"primary transmission" as simply "the
signal broadcast" by a television station. 59
In WON, however, the addition of
teletext to the broadcast signal forced
the courts to more closely examine the
concept of a "primary transmission."
The Act, itself, was of little help. Even
though § 111(f) purports to define a
"primary transmission," the definition
focuses only on the word "primary."
Section 111 (f) defines "primary transmission" as "a transmission made to
the public by the transmitting facility
whose signals are being received and
further transmitted by the secondary
transmission service .... "60 Left to its
own interpretive resources, the WON
district court determined that the
phrase, "control over the primary
transmission," meant control over the
Spring, 1984/The Law Forum-31

copyrighted program,61 even though the
court admitted that the phrase "could
easily mean either alteration of the
signal or editing of the program. "62
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By defining "primary transmission"
as it did, however, the district court
(and later, the appellate court) had to
determine whether the two works, the
news program and the original teletext,
constituted a single copyrightable audiovisual work comprised of a "series of
related images."63 This inquiry was also
fraught with interpretive problems
inasmuch as the Act defines neither
"series" nor "related."

The uSame
Time" Test

Viewer /Same

The district court concluded that the
teletext and nine o'clock news "were
not intended to be viewed together as a
single work by the same viewer at the
same time," and thus did not constitute
one copyrightable audiovisual work. 64
On appeal, the circuit court applied the
same test, but disagreed with the district court's conclusion and held instead that the two works were intended
to be seen at the same time by the same
viewers. The court hypothesized that if
teletext news were broadcast during "a
cartoon show for preschoolers," the
two works would not then be "related
images. "65
The so-called "same viewer/same
time" test applied by both courts in
WGN is inadequate to determine the
copyrightability of teletext and television programs as a single "audiovisual
work." By providing no guidelines for
determining when two works were "intended to be seen by the same viewers,"
the test merely invites judicial conjecture. The WGN appellate court itself
demonstrated the likelihood of widely
inconsistent decisions under the test
when it announced that WGN's teletext
containing local Chicago news and
weather was intended to be seen by the
same cable viewers as were watching the
WGN national news in Albuquerque,
New Mexico. Further, the WGN same
viewer / same time test has the practical
effect of forcing a carrier to retransmit
all teletext broadcast by a station even if
the carrier has no way of knowing if the
teletext might unexpectantly become
"unrelated" to the main program.
In view of the fact that § 111 secondary transmission exemptions were designed to protect cable television and
common carriers, it makes little sense
to apply such a "loose and spongy" ex-

emption eligibility test as the one applied in WGN.66 While it is true that
Congress intended the Copyright Act
of 1976 to be applied to new technologies,67 teletext broadcasting has raised a
carrier exemption problem that cannot
be satisfactorily resolved under the
Act's current wording and legislative
history.
The solution is, of course, a statutory
one. Now that the television and cable
industries have recognized the potential
for teletext broadcasting,68 so must
Congress. If, upon investigation, Congress determines that teletext is as deserving of protection as CATV was,
then it should enact new or clarifying
legislation to safeguard teletext's future
in the competitive broadcast industry.
Should Congress determine that common carrier interference substantially
threatens the wide-spread development
of teletext systems, a simple solution
would be to redraft the definition of
"primary transmission" to mean "the
entire broadcast signal," so that any carrier interference with the teletext would
constitute "control over the primary
transmission" under § 111(a)(3) of the
Act.
On the other hand, should Congress
determine that teletext broadcasts are
too disruptive of the CATV/carrier
copyright scheme to merit special
protection, it might add to the Act a
definition of the word "series" that
does not contemplate two simultaneously
telecast programs. Congress might also
expressly restrict the copyrightability of
teletext broadcast simultaneously with
a main program to that style of teletext
that appears only at the bottom of the
television screen during the featured
program.
Some congressional action with regard to teletext transmissions is necessary to afford common carriers clear
notice of what conduct constitutes
impermissible "control of the primary
transmission." Such legislation will
restore needed stability to the common
carrier exemption that was lost after the
WGN decision.

Conclusion
The passive carrier exemption under
§111(a)(3) of the Act should be
construed to maximize the free flow of
varied program material to CATV systems while ensuring that the carrier is
truly a "passive" intermediary that
neither adds nor subtracts from the
primary transmission and selects its au-

dience only on the basis of legitimate
business reasons. 69
With the introduction of teletext
broadcasts into the carrier exemption
scheme, a strong need exists for congressional action aimed at clarifying the
parameters of carrier "control" over
teletext broadcasts. Such clarification
will result in more consistent judicial
application of the common carrier exemption, which in turn will benefit
both carriers and copyright owners
alike by providing them with clear operational guidelines. ~
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Invisible Teachers
continued from page 36

recognize these facts is indicative of the
caricature to which they are so powerfully impelled.
Another example of the same perceptual quirk is the belief that law
teachers try to hurt students' feelings in
class. Many students see their teachers
as a self-selected group of the meanest
of the legal profession, a group that
seems to get a personal thrill out of
brow beating students. Every reasonable answer begets just another question, and it is frustrating and embarassing to be put on the spot. But to
conclude, because of such feelings, that
the teacher is trying to hurt is for the
student to confuse his personal reactions with the motives of the
professor. It is to ignore the teacher as a
person in his own right, with his own
objectives. The teacher's aim is to
enable the student to respond under
pressure, even in situations where at
first the student thinks he has no
response. The objective is to encourage
the student to think and communicate
even more precisely and effectively than
he thought he could. Law students are
in training to be professional advocates
and counselors. For a professional,
arguments cannot be merely adequate
or normal or bright. Lawyers are paid
to be always clear and sometimes
moving and brilliant in their communications; they must meet this professional obligation even when they feel
embarrassed, even when they are
distracted, even when at first they think
they have no response.
A third example is the belief that the
teacher knows everything. I hesitate to
mention this particular misperception
as it does not normally last past the
third week of classes. At first impression this perception seems inconsistent
with my model because it appears to
acknowledge and enlarge the capacities
of the teacher. But the real reason
students want to believe their teachers
know everything is to justify their
conclusion that it is unreasonable to
expect them to live up to the standard
the teacher appears to set. If a teacher
commands a kind of superhuman
excellence or perfection, students are
excused from paying attention to the
standards he is trying to communicate.
In short, he can be ignored. In fact, of
course, teachers do not normally ask
questions if they are sure of the
answers. They are ultimately seeking to
interest students in questions that they
34-The Law Forum/Spring, I984

find interesting, important, and difficult to answer. The teacher thinks that
the questions he puts are hard questions,
that they are worthy of students'
attention and thought because they are
hard. He surely does not often assume
that there are clear answers to the
questions, let alone that he holds the
answers.
A fourth variation on this theme is
the belief that teachers are singlemindedly interested in legal thinking, in
legal problems, in law. They have no
self doubts, and they arrogantly insist

that students master the profession's
conventions and skills even when they
do not want to. The teacher does not
seem to know about other needs, does
not recognize that all this seriousness
will corrupt pleasant, fun-loving personalities. He does not sense that there
is something a bit narrow and even
threatening about how lawyers think. In
short, the teacher is a reduced person
with reduced vision who sees little of
the broader world.
The truth is that many teachers are
loaded with self-doubts. They have
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already mastered the skills that they are
trying to impart and are familiar with
the conventions of the profession. They
know that putting legal skills into
action can do a lot of harm. They have
seen legal arguments intensify and even
initiate disagreements rather than re~
solve them; they have seen students
who-having just learned to say "inter
alia" or divide their arguments into
three numbered sections (and even
perhaps remember the third part of the
argument )-feel that because of these
skills they have somehow become
superior to other citizens; they have
seen first~year law students disdain the
"fuzzy" thinking of other citizens and
even of their spouses and friends, so
that they exhibit an aggresive over~
confidence that is sometimes never
outgrown; they are well aware of judges
who think that some special skill
entitles them to a superior place in the
resolution of social problems. Teachers
may love their craft and the skills of
their profession, but they are at least as
aware of the limitations as anyone else.
They spend a great deal of their
academic effort questioning basic as~
sumptions about how law is used, at
attempting to locate the limitations of
law. They want students to master the
techniques and then to transcend them.
Sooner or later (and this mispercep~
tion tends to last indefinitely) many
students come to believe that their
teachers know nothing, are not there at
all. The most common version of this
belief is that teachers are not interested
in practical things. Put bluntly, students
adopt this attitude because their teachers
insist that they continue thinking about
problems when they are tired of them.
Students and alumni criticize teachers
as "too abstract," "too impractical,"
"too academic," but these are merely
euphemisms for exasperation. Most law
teachers have practiced law, many still
do, and some will go back to the
practice full time. Of course, the
faculty's academic interests may differ
from the students' interests from time
to time, but there is no real doubt that
the skills being taught are generally the
skills needed in practice. Law students
are taught to be precise, to develop the
capacity to forsee potential weaknesses
in their own arguments, to be orderly,
to be complete, to be imaginative in the
construction of legal arguments. These
are the intellectual skills that the
practice of law requires.
Another version of the belief that the
teacher knows nothing is the distres~

singly common view that law teachers
are trying to convince their students
that there are always two sides to every
argument. Many law students believe
they have seen deeply into the purposes
of legal education when they conclude
that anyone argument is as good as any
other, that the important thing is just to
be able to come up with an argument.
Students might come to this conclusion
because teachers tend to raise additional
questions in response to most answers.
The perceived message is that the
student is to learn to make an
argument, any argument; one must be
as good as another since there are
problems with all arguments. This
perception is almost completely wrong.
Teachers, of course, question answers
so that students will learn to discover
possible weaknesses in even their
strongest arguments. Moreover, most
teachers want students to be able to
judge quality for themselves. They do
not make a habit of telling students
when their answers are "right" because
a lawyer must learn to judge indepen~
dently, by his own standards, when an
argument is good enough. The point of
all those questions is, in fact, to show
students how to judge quality in
argument, not to urge the view that
quality is irrelevant.
I do not mean these observations to
be self~serving. There is some truth in
all the misperceptions that I have
described. Every faculty member has
many weaknesses, as does legal educa~
tion in general. But the misperceptions
distort-even oppose-what I think
most law teachers know to be true. In
this way they illustrate how powerful is
the urge that students feel to diminish
their teachers. Legal education is still
fairly rigorous, and it involves many
real frustrations and disappointments.
Only some of these are caused by
faculty members. To caricature and
ultimately to try to eliminate the
teacher that stands in front of them is a
way for students to make the teacher
responsible for all the difficulties
associated with becoming educated in
law. Law students in this regard only
share (and perhaps enlarge) the near
universal desire of students to avoid
taking responsibility for their own
education. Sadly, like any group subject
to fairly constant misperception,
teachers are under pressure to in~
ternalize the distorted image of them~
selves reflected in their students' eyes.
Much of the malaise in legal education
today may be as much a consequence of

the resulting personal unhappiness as it
is of any real ineffectiveness inherent in
prevalent teaching techniques.
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